PROPAGATION OF THE US GREAT DEPRESSION
Banking crises may cause severe macroeconomic consequences. However, a framework for convincingly isolating and demonstrating those consequences in real-world economies has proven elusive. Hence the issue of how banking crises are linked to economic performance is of great interest in banking and macroeconomic literature. Bernanke (1983) formally introduced the idea that banking sector disintermediation could link banking crises and macroeconomic performance. He reported convincing empirical results of a significant relationship between failed bank deposits and industrial output declines during the Great Depression. This so-called credit hypothesis forms the basis for more recent debates regarding the relative importance of credit supply or demand as the source of disintermediation (e.g., see Calomiris and Mason 2002b) . However, it is important to realize that the basic credit hypothesis itself still has not been properly tested. While Bernanke tested a rough proxy for the source of disintermediation in his credit hypothesis -a monthly flow of deposits in failed banks -even he hypothesized that the source of disintermediation more accurately lies in the mechanism through which deposits in closed banks are returned to depositors and ultimately the banking system itself through the process of asset liquidation. For this reason, we revisit Bernanke's original credit channel hypothesis with data and evidence relating to liquidation delays that was not available in his original study.
More specifically, this paper examines bank asset liquidations during the Great Depression and their relation to business cycle persistence. As in Mason (2002) , when a bank fails a trustee is charged with selling assets and maximizing creditor returns. Each period, the trustee can sell assets at the current market price or wait another period and incur a positive opportunity cost. In this manner bank failures transform liquid deposits into illiquid investments with uncertain maturity. 1 The longer it takes to return funds to depositors, the longer funds remain unavailable for investment or consumption. The cycle feeds upon itself as lower investment and consumption are accompanied by lower asset price growth, again prompting the trustee to wait yet another period. Hence longer slower liquidations should be associated with stronger business cycle persistence.
Indeed, this pattern seems evident in the Great Depression. Almost one-third of U.S. banks failed during the Great Depression. Bernanke (1983) argued that disruption of the credit intermediation process due to bank failures and general turmoil in financial markets had significant effects on macroeconomic activity. While Bernanke did not have data adequate to test the relationships in the present paper, he inferred that the duration of credit effects stemming from the bank failures should depend on the how long it would take to revitalize credit channels that intermediate public savings into business investment and rehabilitate insolvent debtors (1983, p. 272 ).
Below we extend Bernanke's (1983) analysis by introducing data that more accurately characterizes the duration of credit effects as a process linked to frictions in the intermediation process and rehabilitating insolvent debtors. First, we demonstrate that asset liquidations of nationally chartered banks -those with the highest quality assets -during the Great Depression averaged just over six years and proceeded at a fairly linear rate. 2 As these illiquid "deposits"
were returned to depositors in the mid-to late-1930s economic growth improved. Hence we suggest there exists both a logical economic relationship between deposit liquidation and the persistence of the Great Depression, and therefore a high statistical correlation between the two processes.
Next, we formally analyze time series data on the stock of unliquidated deposits in closed national banks during the period [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] . Even casual inspection of the deposit stock series clearly reveals the slow liquidation of bank assets during a period of macroeconomic difficulty.
Indeed, contrary to previous literature, this data series suggests that knock-on effects of the banking crises of the Great Depression did not end with the bank holiday of March 1933 but persisted well into the late 1930s.
We employ vector autoregression (i.e., VEC and VAR) models to investigate the explanatory power of the amortized stock of failed national bank deposits during the Depression as a more accurate proxy for the time it takes to rehabilitate insolvent debtors or liquidate their collateral. Forecast error variance (FEV) decompositions indicate that the stock of closed bank deposits is as important as the money stock in terms of explaining output changes over forecast horizons from one to ten years. Impulse response functions show that banking sector shocks measured by the stock variable lasted for about five years. Together these findings suggest that the prolonged banking crisis was a major factor in explaining the persistence of the Great Depression into the late 1930s. Further results show that banking sector shocks had permanent negative effects on money supply and transitory negative effects on prices. Thus, the dynamic effects of banking sector disruptions were cumulative and pervasive during the Depression. We conclude that our results using the stock of closed bank deposits strongly support Bernanke's inference that the duration of banking sector distress, as measured by the liquidation experience, is important in explaining the persistence of the U.S. Great Depression.
From a policy perspective, our results suggest that deposit insurance can reduce the depth and persistence of severe business downturns by maintaining depositors' access to funds so that they can be reinvested quickly and efficiently in the financial sector. We also, however, suggest that it may be important for the deposit insurer (or other entity) to act as an asset management company, mitigating asset price volatility by liquidating bank assets at a controlled, reasonable rate that reduces asset market overhang. 3 This observation constitutes an important, oftenoverlooked, macroeconomic role for deposit insurance beyond the narrow microeconomic objective of containing potential market failure and contagion in the financial services sector.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section I provides a background discussion of bank failures and liquidations in the Great Depression; Section II provides details on our liquidation series and demonstrates the magnitude of the liquidation problem; Section III describes the econometric methods; Section IV reports the empirical results; and the last section summarizes and concludes.
I. Background on Bank Failures, Suspensions, and Asset Liquidations

A. Receiverships and Voluntary Liquidations versus Suspensions
Literature on bank difficulties during the Great Depression typically makes little distinction between bank receiverships (failure arising from regulatory action) and voluntary liquidations (failure arising from action by the bank itself), and bank suspensions. In all cases, a bank closes and customers lose access to their funds. The cases differ, however, in how long the customer loses access and the balance to which the customer regains access.
Under the bankruptcy law of the period, receivers were not imbued with any responsibility for resuscitating the bank, only managing the liquidation of its assets and appropriately distributing the funds from that liquidation to creditors (Mason 1996 
B. The Liquidation Experience
The previous section suggests that mixing bank failures and suspensions overstates the incidence of economically meaningful bank failure. But why is that overstatement economically important? Because it may take a long time for bank customers to regain access to their balances in the event of a failure, while that is not generally the case in suspensions. When customers do not have access to bank balances, that money cannot be used for savings (outside the present investment in insolvent bank assets) or consumption expenditures. Worse yet, when a bank was liquidated, the best assets were usually presented for sale to larger banks in the cities. As the Great Depression progressed and city banks took on more failed-bank assets, the price they offered for additional assets fell dramatically, leading trustees to wait for price recovery. With low interest rates, waiting entailed little opportunity cost (e.g., promoting further delay). Hence, in practice the progress of bank liquidation may slow considerably as trustees search for reasonable asset prices while the crisis deepens.
Mason (2002) In summary, since the average liquidation time among national banks during the Great Depression was slightly more than six years (at about a straight-line average rate), customers could remain illiquid for quite some time. 6 (A more detailed presentation of the length and rate of bank liquidations, along with estimates of the opportunity cost of delay, is provided in the data section.) Furthermore, liquidation times and rates are variables in a potentially endogenous cycle that may, if large enough, be a primary source of business cycle persistence.
C. The Macroeconomic Importance of Liquidations
The above discussion underscores the importance of careful bank liquidation in supporting economic growth. An important effect of slow deposit liquidations in the 1930s arises because, without deposit insurance, deposit balances are unavailable to either consumers or banks during the period of liquidation. This observation is the basis of one of the primary debates about the source of economic effects arising from bank failures during the Great Depression. 7 One side of the debate holds that the primary effect on economic growth arose from decreased consumer demand for goods and services (real effects), which reduced credit demand and instigated a cycle of economic deterioration. The other side holds that banks' lack of funds reduced credit supply, again propagating a cycle of economic deterioration.
In this paper, we argue that regardless of the channel of knock-on influences that reinforce economic conditions, it is important to revisit the source of the initial shock to credit supply and/or demand. We believe that an important, often-overlooked, contributor to this initial shock is the liquidation technology used to resolve bank failures.
Our approach extends Bernanke's (1983) original research. It is important to recognize that although he initiated the credit supply/demand debate, Bernanke (1983) really only sought to identify a plausible mechanism that could explain the propagation of the Great Depression beyond Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) classic account. Without this mechanism, there is no credit supply/demand debate.
Bernanke also wrote in his article that the version of the credit view he tested econometrically was imperfectly specified. Although Bernanke only possessed data that is best described as the flow of deposits in closed banks per month, he surmised that as "…a matter of theory, the duration of the credit effects … depends on the amount of time it takes to 1) establish new or revive old channels of credit flow after a major disruption and 2) rehabilitate insolvent debtors" (1983, p. 272) . The difficult and slow adjustment of these two factors forms the basis of Bernanke's argument for the persistence of nonmonetary effects. However, lacking relevant data, anecdotal detail and subjective survey reports are the only sources of evidence given for this centrally important assertion.
The present study therefore fills an important gap in the literature. Our data on bank asset liquidations captures many of the effects Bernanke's failed and suspended bank deposit flow data lacked. Our liquidation data more accurately captures creditor sentiment in the economy, reflecting both the potential for redeposit (the credit supply channel) and/or increased capacity for consumption (the credit demand channel) more accurately than the series used previously.
Thus it is not surprising that our data demonstrate a high correlation between bank liquidation and economic recovery during the Great Depression. Indeed, our data series of Two differences are apparent among the series in Figure 1 . The first is one of magnitude.
Our series is a stock of unliquidated deposits from failed banks, whereas the more familiar series are flows of deposits into that unliquidated stock. Because of liquidation delays, the stock grows It appears, therefore, that the relevant effect Bernanke originally attempted to measure is more one of asset market "seizing" in reaction to persistent high asymmetric information following banking crises. Bank asset liquidation data characterizes that effect more directly than simple failed bank deposit flow data because the liquidation data inherently reflects the runoff in creditor incapacity (for the credit demand hypothesis) and liquidity (for the credit supply hypothesis) that is believed to correlate with economic recovery.
II. Data Description
Our data are hand-gathered from almost 15,000 individual national bank liquidation The results in Table 1 indicate that, on average, only about twenty percent of the final amount was paid out in year zero, the year of failure. Another forty percent, on average was paid out in year one, fifteen percent in year two, seven percent in year three, and the remaining portion in the several years following. The standard deviations around these means are also greatest during the first few years of resolution, though this is probably due to a higher average payout percentage in the first three years relative to subsequent periods. The coefficient of variation for year zero is higher than years one or two, which could be due to the effects of dates of failure within a given year. Banks failing late in the Comptroller's fiscal year would be expected to report fewer assets liquidated than those failing earlier in the year. The effect of failure timing within the year diminishes as liquidation progresses over the next couple of years, reflected by decreasing coefficients of variation. Coefficients of variation again rise above year zero in later years, possibly due to the greater difficulties associated with selling less liquid assets later in the resolution.
The distribution of liquidation rates is illustrated more generally by the shading in Table   1 . Dark shading in Table 1 Years zero and one in Table 1 are shaded dark in every year, indicating high liquidation rates in the first two years are typical, in accordance with the relatively low coefficients of variation for these years. Years two and three in Table 1 are sometimes dark, sometimes light, and sometimes unshaded, indicating more variation in liquidation rates during these years. This explains the higher coefficients of variation on collections in these years. Liquidations in years four through six never exceeded 10%, though out of the eleven years of failures covered in Table   1 , six proceeded at the 5% to 10% level in year four, four proceeded at that rate in year five, and two proceeded at that rate in year six. Thus by year six, the standard deviation of the collection rate is falling, but due to low amounts collected in these years, the coefficient of variation is rising. Table 2 shows that average present value discounts on assets in liquidation during the 1930s range from an average of 1% (using Treasury bill rates) to around 7.25% (using Moody's Baa rates). The discounts across years using Treasury bill rates range from 0.05% to 4.06%.
Using Baa rates, they range from 4.10% to 11.94%. Overall, the time spent liquidating banks contributed somewhere in the neighborhood of $100 million to $500 million to direct liquidation costs, which amounts to around 50 basis points of average 1929-1940 GNP.
Based on Table 1 , it appears that liquidations of banks failing in the crisis years of 1931 and 1932 are longer and slower than liquidations of banks failing at other times. Interestingly, the highest discounts do not necessarily come from banks failing in those crisis years, but from those failing in years preceding interest rate peaks in the discount rate series, 1931 and 1937.
Hence, as in Mason (2002) , there appears to exist an interplay between discount rate -growth spreads and asset price volatility that creates high opportunity costs in Table 2 for banks that are the most unliquidated at the discount rate spikes, i.e., recent failures. We believe that the sorts of effects illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 are the root source of illiquidity and uncertainty, and are therefore correlated with macroeconomic recovery How does the liquidation experience empirically relate to economic recovery? Consider, for example, the experience of banks that failed in 1933. Table 1 shows that by year five, the collection rate for banks failing in 1933 was 6.90%, for a cumulative total of 85.55%. Since the final recovery national from banks that failed in 1933 was around $0.78 per $1 of deposits prior to failure, the recovery at this point amounted to about $0.67 per $1 of deposits prior to failure (85.55% x $0.78). At this point liquidation rates diminished considerably (to about one percent per year) and creditors would be expected to estimate a low expected present value of additional recoveries. Hence, the liquidation process settles down in 1938, just prior to economic recovery.
A similar pattern can be seen (indicated by the stepped line in Table 1) 
III. Econometric Methods
In sum, delays in liquidating bank failures resulted in direct effects, including depositor illiquidity, asset market overhang, and money contraction, as well as a number of negative spillover effects, such as deposit disintermediation, declining collateral values for real assets, reduced real asset liquidity, and increased credit restrictions. These events forced banks to increase liquidity and shed risk (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Calomiris and Wilson, 1998) .
Like Bernanke (1983), we believe the depth of the Great Depression was driven in large part by the duration of -and interplay between -money, price, and credit effects. Under this interpretation of events, the initial rapid collapse in expenditures under the Keynesian view was a trigger mechanism that set the stage for the subsequent more complex and potentially damaging transmission process that generated large persistent fluctuations in output during the Depression.
We formally test our conjectures of whether liquidation is an important determinant of this process by modifying Bernanke's (1983) model of credit disruption and macroeconomic performance. We do so by substituting our series of bank distress created from national bank deposits in liquidation for the common series of failed and suspended bank deposit flows in Bernanke's (1983) model. Ultimately, we find that the revised series better explains business cycle persistence into the late 1930s. We construct a four-variable VAR model of the U.S. economy employing the following variables: (1) index of industrial production as a measure of macroeconomic activity (INP), (2) wholesale price index (WPI) for prices, (3) M1 for money supply (MS1) (4) and the stock of failed national banks' deposits for credit availability (DCB). These variables are the same as in Bernanke's 1983 paper, with the exception of the last variable, which we have seen differs markedly from the flow specification of deposits in closed banks. We experimented with other series in the specifications, but these additions and substitutions detracted from the explanatory ability of the model and are not reported here. For the sake of exposition, the Appendix contains a technical description of the VAR methodology, including FEV decompositions, impulse response functions, and associated statistical tests. Three important issues must be addressed in empirical estimation of a VAR model: (1) the order of the VAR (i.e., lag length of the variables), (2) the specification of the VAR in levels or first differences of the variables, and (3) the identification of the estimated model. For the determination of the lag order, we use an asymptotic chi-square test suggested by Sims (1980) . The Sims procedure begins by testing a VAR model of order one against a VAR model of order two, then a VAR model of order two against a VAR model of order three, etc…
To determine whether to specify the model in levels or the first differences of the variables, we test the variables for cointegration (i.e., the existence of a set of long-run relationships between the variables in the VAR system) using a test procedure suggested by Johansen (1989) . If the variables are cointegrated, then a VAR model using first differences of the variables is misspecified. In this case the VAR model must be specified as a cointegrated VAR model (i.e., restricted by the cointegrating vectors), which is known as a restricted VAR model or vector error correction (VEC) model. Engle and Granger (1987) have shown that the cointegrating restriction is satisfied asymptotically by a VAR in levels of the variables. Thus, it is appropriate to specify and estimate both unrestricted and restricted VAR models and examine the resultant impulse response functions and variance decompositions.
For the identification of the VAR and VEC models, we rely on the generated impulse response functions from the models. Since the models contain aggregate output and aggregate price variables, they are identified if the response of output to a shock in price is positive (negative) and the response of price to output is negative (positive). The positive response represents the supply side of the economy, and the negative response corresponds to the demand side.
We estimate orthogonalized and nonorthogonalized variance decompositions for industrial production. The orthogonalized decompositions are estimated using Choleski's decomposition of the covariance matrix. It is well known that there are two problems associated with orthogonalized variance decompositions. First, the orthogonalized error variances will not be invariant to the ordering of the variables in the VAR. Second, under orthogonalized error variance decomposition, the decomposed error variances add up to unity by construction. For these reasons, we also use a nonorthogonalized error variance method developed by Pesaran and Shin (1998) known as generalized variance decompositions. The decomposition results from the generalized method are invariant to ordering of the variables in the VAR and the sum of forecast error variances need not sum up to unity. Table 3 , a VAR model of order 12 or higher is suggested. A VAR model with 12 monthly lags was estimated and found to be serially correlated using the LaGrange multiplier test. Upon increasing the lag length to 13, the resultant model passed the serial correlation test; hence, a VAR model of order 13 was selected. Using
IV. Empirical Results
Based on the Sims test results in
Johansen's method, we employed the same lag structure and tested for the existence of cointegration among the four variables. Since this method is applicable to time series variables that are integrated of order one (i.e., nonstationary in levels but stationary in first differences), we pretested the four variables using augmented Dickey and Fuller (ADF) unit root tests. As shown in Table 4 , the unit root test results indicated that all four variables are integrated of order one. Furthermore, the Johansen's test results shown in Table 5 suggested the existence of two cointegrating vectors. Hence, we estimated a cointegrated VAR model with 13 monthly lags that was restricted with two cointegrating vectors.
To check whether the estimated models are identified, we estimated impulse response functions for the two models over a seven-year period (see Figures 3 and 4) . Referring to the restricted VAR (VEC) model, Figure 3 .1 shows the responses of the index of industrial production to a one standard deviation shock in prices. The positive response of output to price shocks confirms the supply relation. Also, as shown in Figure 3 Figure 3 .3 shows that a one standard deviation shock in the stock of failed-bank deposits had an immediate and sharp negative effect on the index of industrial production. The duration of the negative effects of a failed-bank deposit shock is about 60 months (or five years), which is likely determined by the time path of the multiple credit effects discussed in the previous section. Moreover, notice that a permanent negative effect is not obtained after 60 months, which we interpret as at least weak evidence that the eventual resolution of closed banks rectified credit channel problems.
Turning to other impulse response functions, Figure 3 .9 shows that failed-bank deposits had negative effects on money supply that gradually increased in magnitude over about 30 months and thereafter became permanent. This evidence implies that delayed resolution of closed banks played a major role in money supply contraction during the Depression. As seen in Figure 3 .6, prices were also negatively affected by closed bank deposits for about 40 months, but this negative effect was not permanent. Consistent with our historical observations, we infer from this evidence that credit effects can spread out and interact with a wide variety of macroeconomic variables.
Since the impulse response functions for the unrestricted VAR model in Figure 4 are very similar to those for the restricted VAR model in Figure 3 , we infer that the impulse response function results are invariant to VEC versus VAR model specification. Table 6 reports the estimates of the forecast error variance (FEV) decompositions of the four variables in the restricted VAR system based on the Choleski method of orthogonalization of the covariance matrix. The FEVs are estimated over a ten-year forecast horizon. Since the results from the Choleski method can depend on the ordering of the variables, the left panel of Table 6 reports the range of FEVs obtained from ordering the index of industrial production and deposits of failed banks either first or last in the decomposition process. As shown there, the ordering of the variables does not have a large effect on the FEVs. The right panel of Table 6 summarizes these results by giving the averages of the FEV ranges provided in the left panel.
The average FEVs reported in the right panel of Table 6 indicate that own (output or INP) shocks were important only for a one-year forecast horizon. Over longer forecast horizons the FEVs of prices, money supply, and closed bank deposits played increasingly important roles in explaining variations in output. The percentage of squared prediction error of the index of industrial production attributable to price shocks increases from 26.1 % in the first year of the forecast horizon to more than 30 percent in the second year and then gradually increases to over 45 percent by the end of the fifth year. By years six or seven in the forecast horizon the full effects of price changes on output are permanent. The FEV of industrial production attributable to money supply was 13.8 % in the first year of the forecast horizon and thereafter reflects a permanent effect over time. By comparison, the stock of failed-bank deposits appears to have a stronger effect than money supply on output over time. Shocks to bank deposits explain more than 30 percent of the squared prediction error of the index of industrial production at the end of the second year of the forecast horizon and thereafter the FEVs reach a permanent level.
The FEV results from the unrestricted VAR model in Table 7 provide further evidence on the interactions between the variables under study and persistence of their respective effects on output. Own shocks on industrial production produce FEVs over the forecast horizon that are similar to those for the VEC model. Also, the FEVs for price shocks are like those discussed above for the VAR model. In the FEVs for money and failed-bank deposits shocks, the money supply appears to have a stronger effect than failed-bank deposits on output. FEVs for money supply rise from about 17 percent in the first year of the forecast horizon to over 30 percent by the third year. By contrast, FEVs for failed-bank deposits rise from 9 % in the first year of the forecast horizon to about 20 percent by the fourth year and then decline to about 17 percent in later years of the forecast horizon. Tables 8 and 9 report the estimates of generalized FEV decompositions for industrial output from the VEC and VAR models, respectively, using nonorthogonalized error variances that are invariant to ordering of the variables in the VAR system. A comparison of the results from nonorthogonalized errors and the corresponding average results from orthogonalized error variances shows that the two methods produce very similar results. We infer that the results are robust to orthogonalized versus nonorthogonalized VEC and VAR specifications.
In sum, the FEV and impulse response function results for the VEC and unrestricted VAR models are consistent with one another for the most part. The results reveal that bank insolvencies and subsequent liquidation processes negatively affect both the depth and duration of output declines during the Great Depression. Interestingly, shocks in the stock of failed-bank deposits were comparable to money supply shocks in terms of their effects on economic activity.
These results strongly favor a hypothesis by which nonmonetary effects originating in the deposit liquidation function augmented monetary effects in causing the magnitude and persistence of the economic collapse during the Great Depression.
V. Summary and Conclusions
Anecdotal accounts and surveys of disintermediation, liquidity, and wealth effects arising from bank failures intuitively suggest that bank failures play a role in long-run business cycle persistence. However, previous empirical work on the credit channel hypothesis has been limited to measuring short-run effects of bank failures, which declined substantially after 1933 and ceased by 1935. We provide empirical evidence that suggests failed bank liquidations are a promising source of the type of dynamic long-run economic relationship between bank failures and persistence sought by Bernanke (1983) and others.
We examine potential persistence effects arising from the slow liquidation of failed-bank deposits by constructing a data series containing the stock of closed national bank deposits for the period [1921] [1922] [1923] [1924] [1925] [1926] [1927] [1928] [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] . Casual inspection of our data series indicates that monetary contraction, liquidity effects, and asset market overhang arising from slow liquidation rates correlate well with business cycle persistence following the Great Depression. From this evidence we infer that banking distress during the Depression lasted around ten years, rather than merely five years as previously measured.
The long duration of banking distress, as measured by liquidation time, is by itself a compelling case for the notion that a number of varied effects stemming from the slow liquidation of bank assets worsened and lengthened the economic collapse during the Depression. We formally investigate the relationship between the liquidation of failed banks and the persistence of the Depression using vector autoregression (i.e., VEC and VAR) models.
Based on different variable orderings and orthogonal assumptions, we find that changes in prices explained the largest proportion of fluctuations in industrial output. We also find that the stock of failed-bank deposits is as important as money stock in terms of explaining output changes over forecast horizons from one to ten years. Failed-bank deposit shocks lasted for about five years and then became transitory. Furthermore, failed-bank deposit shocks had permanent negative effects on money supply and transitory negative effects on prices. Consistent with recent theories concerning linkages between the financial system and economic growth, we infer that the dynamic effects of banking sector shocks were cumulative and pervasive during the Depression.
Hence it appears that the liquidation function is accompanied by important, and sometimes unrecognized, macroeconomic policy implications.
Footnotes
1 Although a wealth loss certainly occurs in the liquidation, we assume that reasonably accurate expectations of the magnitude of the loss can be formed at the time of failure. From the time of failure the illiquid deposit "investment" may accumulate a positive return as asset values appreciate (see Mason 2002) . 2 Lower quality state bank assets would be expected to take longer to liquidate. Comparisons of state and national bank liquidations are discussed at length in the data section. 3 The Resolution Trust Corporation is widely credited for successfully mitigating asset price declines, especially in the real estate sector, and thereby reducing business cycle persistence in the late 1980s and early 1990s in the US. See Klingebiel (1998) for a description of asset management companies used to smooth financial crises in a number of countries. Mason (2002) further addresses the efficiency and profitability of these arrangements in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) liquidations during the 1990s. Kaufman and Seelig (2000) observe that potential depositor losses in bank failures and associated economic damage can be reduced by timely resolution of failed institutions. 4 Mason 1996 Table 1 .5, for instance, illustrates the heterogeneity in state suspension terms just prior to the national bank holiday of March 1933. 5 Proponents of the suspension view will maintain that it does not take outright bank failure to promote disintermediation that can lead to business cycle persistence. While we feel that view is appropriate, the existing failure-suspension series then understates financial distress by omitting suspensions of national banks that closed according to state bank holidays. Neither series includes outflows of deposits from banks that did not fail, yet another meaningful, albeit more commonly used, measure of disintermediation analyzed at length in Calomiris and Mason (2002a and 2002b) . 6 There already exists a literature on wealth effects of depositor recoveries (see, for instance, the discussion of wealth effects in Friedman and Schwartz 1963) . Average payouts for national banks were about $0.56 per dollar of deposits. 7 See Calomiris and Mason (2002b) for an extensive description of the debate.
8 See Mason 1996 for background on these recapitalization attempts. 9 Two additional points are noteworthy concerning our closed bank deposit data series. First, we take into account the deposits of banks that failed prior to 1920 and were still being liquidated by including them in the amortization process. Because there were not many failed banks during the period leading up to 1920, this data adjustment had little effect on our data series. Second, it is possible that our average 6.14 year receivership duration is biased upward by a number of small banks with illiquid assets. Since the average duration weighted by the size of the bank is 16.09 years, we reject this possibility. 10 Although banks in all states were closed for the three-day holiday in March 1933, even those not immediately certified as sound thereafter usually operated on a limited basis, enabling withdrawals of at least a portion of customer deposits. 11 The FDIC estimated deposits in failed banks annually in an exercise to ascertain probable loss rates it may face providing insurance coverage. This annual series is different from the suspension and failure series referred to earlier. The source of this data is the FDIC Annual Report (1940, p. 66 ).
Technical Appendix: The VAR Methodology
Let y t be an (n x 1) vector of time series variables (t = 1, …, T). Then a vector autoregression (VAR) of order p is defined as:
where µ is an n x 1 vector of intercepts, Φ i are n x n matrices (i = 1, …, p), w t is a q x 1 vector of deterministic or exogenous variables, and ε t is a n x 1 vector of disturbances, such that: E(ε t ) = 0, E(ε t ε t ′) = Σ for all t, with Σ an n x n positive-definite matrix and E(ε t ε t ′) = 0 for all t ≠ t′.
Since the VAR model in equation (1A) is basically a multivariate generalization of the univariate autoregressive model (AR), it is possible to write a VAR in vector moving average form. The moving average representation, MA, is written as:
where the matrices A j are given by the following recursive relations:
with A 0 = I n , A j = 0 for j<0, and B j = A j ψ for j = 1,2, ….
Impulse response analysis. The impulse response function shows the time profile of the response of one variable to a shock in another variable in the VAR system. Since a VAR model is specified and estimated in a reduced form, the original errors, u t (i.e., the error terms associated with the structural VAR model) must be estimated from the reduced form errors. For this purpose, we use the Choleski factorization, in which a positive definite symmetric matrix is decomposed as the product of two triangular matrixes. Thus, covariance matrix of shocks, ε t , is decomposed as: Σ = TT′, where T is lower triangular matrix. Sims employed the Choleski decomposition and wrote the moving average representation (2A) as: $400,000,000 $600,000,000 $800,000,000 $1,000,000,000 $1,200,000,000 $1,400,000,000
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